ABSTRACT Recently, a new color image encryption scheme based on hybrid hyper-chaotic system and cellular automata was proposed. In order to generate different key streams according to different plaintexts, the sum of pixel values of each component of the original color image apart from the secret keys is used to determine the initial value of logistic map for encryption. It was claimed that the scheme can resist kinds of attacks. However, this paper found out three security drawbacks about the original encryption scheme and proposed an effective attack method using chosen-plaintext attack by cryptanalysis. The equivalent permutation key stream can be obtained by adjusting individual pixel values of the chosen plaintexts while keeping the sum of pixel values of each color channel unchanged, and all 256 possibilities of equivalent diffusion key streams can be obtained by using 512 specific chosen plaintexts. In addition, the main stages of the proposed attack method, including breaking diffusion and breaking permutation, are exchangeable. The effectiveness of our method is supported by both theoretical analyses and experimental results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, a large number of users exploit Internet for communicating, shopping and finding information, and massive data are generated each day, in which the digital images have a large proportion. The huge amount of image data need to be protected against malicious manipulation. Encryption technology can turn a meaningful image into a noiselike image for protecting the confidentiality of the image in storing and transmission on the open and shared networks. It is well known that chaotic map is a powerful tool for image encryption since there are many similar intrinsic features between chaos and cryptography, such as ergodicity, sensitivity to initial condition and control parameters, etc. Compared with the traditional encryption schemes, the chaotic image encryption algorithms have the advantages of high security, high efficiency, reasonable calculation cost [1] - [3] . Therefore, the application of chaos in the field of image encryption has been a hotspot [4] - [12] . In recent researches, most chaotic encryption algorithms [13] - [25] are designed based on Fridrich's structure of permutationsubstitution [9] .
On the other hand, cryptanalysis which aims to promote the perfection of image cryptosystems verified that some encryption schemes were not secure enough to resist attacks [26] - [37] . For example, the Fridrich's scheme has been attacked by chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) in [26] . A cryptographic analysis has been done in [27] to crack an encryption algorithm based on auto-blocking and electrocardiography, which uses Logistic map and 2-D Arnold map to generate pseudo random number sequences. Diab and El-Semary [28] , an efficient cryptographic algorithm by reusing the permutation matrix dynamically based on Baker map has been broken . The security of a novel color image encryption algorithm based on rectangular transformed 2-D Arnold map has been analyzed and attacked in [29] . Ahmad et al. [30] have broken an image encryption algorithm based on the piecewise linear chaotic map (PWLCM) and inertial delayed neural network. An image encryption algorithm was cryptanalyzed and improved by Wang et al. [31] which utilizes DNA addition to scramble pixel values of image and then masks the scrambled image with two logistics maps. In [32] , a color image encryption scheme based on skew tent map and hyper chaotic system of 6th-order cellular neural network (CNN) was cryptanalyzed. In these schemes, the used Logistic map, 2D Arnold map, skew tent map, Baker map or even PWLCM, are all 1D or 2D chaotic systems. Some researchers pointed out that the security of the image encryption schemes using low-dimensional chaotic systems is not enough, and the image cryptosystems based on hyper-chaotic systems have strong robustness to resist more attacks because they have larger key space and higher key sensitivity [13] - [16] , [19] - [22] .
In the current research of image encryption, scholars often combine the hyper-dimension chaos with other techniques to obtain a more ideal encryption effect. Wu et al. [13] by combining a hyper-chaotic system with the 2D discrete wavelet transform (DWT) technique, proposed a lossless encryption scheme for color images. Two color image encryption algorithms based on DNA sequence operation and different hyper-chaotic systems were introduced in [14] and [19] . In [20] , Dong designed a color image encryption scheme based on the 3-D Rabinovich chaotic system, and the onetime keys are generated by both the initial keys and the hash value of the plain image. In [21] , a color image encryption algorithm based on a complex chaotic system which combines two high-dimensional chaotic systems was proposed. However, the hyper-chaos-based cryptosystems are still not secure enough. Özkaynak [35] , a new analysis roadmap proposed shows a checklist including 12 steps for testing security of an encryption method. Fatih said that many hyperchaosbased proposals involve various weaknesses because the steps of the checklist have not been followed. This checklist can test most plaintext-irrelated encryption schemes including those mentioned above. However, it does not work with the plaintext-related encryption algorithms.
In the latest Niyat et al. [22] firstly combine Cellular Automata (CA) with hyper-dimensional chaotic systems in the color encryption. CA, which has a simple structure, random performance and complex behavior, is easy for hardware/software implementation [22] , [38] - [40] . The cryptosystem [22] uses the structure of permutation-diffusion. In the permutation stage, a three-dimensional Arnold map was employed to break the spatial correlation of the color image by rearranging the rows and columns of each color component. In the diffusion phase, a one-dimensional Logistic map and a one-dimensional non-uniform CA was used to create an image key, then hyper-chaotic Chen system was used to select image key values to encrypt each components of color image. It was claimed that the approach is robust against different kinds of attacks, because the initial value of Logistic map is plaintext-related, that is, it is determined by the sum of pixel values of each component of the original color image. However, in this paper, we found that there are three defects in the original scheme by theoretical analysis and experimental verification. Also, we proposed an attack scheme based on CPA. The effectiveness of the attack is supported by theoretical analysis and simulation experiments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the original color image encryption scheme. Three security vulnerabilities of the original scheme are analyzed in Section III. Section IV gives a commutable attack scheme and the corresponding experimental results. Conclusion is drawn in the last section.
II. REVIEW OF THE COLOR IMAGE CRYPTOSYSTEM A. THE THREE CHAOTIC MAPS
In [22] , three chaotic systems, which comprised of onedimensional Logistic chaotic map, 3-D cat map and Chen-hyper chaotic system, are used to generate the key streams.
The Logistic map is used to initialize cellular automata. It is described as
Parameter α and initial value of X 0 are considered as secret keys. For α ∈ (3.57, 4) and X 0 ∈ (0, 1), the Logistic map is chaotic. The initial value X 0 used in the scheme is changed with the different plaintext, that is, X 0 is not a fixed value, while the parameter α is a fixed value. The 3-D Arnold cat system is used to generate six pseudorandom sequences for permuting the rows and columns of each color component in permutation phase of the original scheme. This map is governed by Chen-system used to select image key values to encrypt each component of color image is described as
where a, b and c are parameters of the Chen-system. When setting a = 35, b = 3 and c ∈ [20, 28.4] , the system is chaotic. The initial and parameter values of the Chen system are fixed values.
B. CELLULAR AUTOMATA
CA is a discrete time model composed of a grid of cells with a finite number of states, such as on and off states. In a onedimensional CA, each cell has two adjacent cells, each of which has two possible values, that is, 0 and 1. Thus, there are 2×2×2 = 2 3 possible binary states for the three neighboring cells. Also, for an 8 bit binary CA, there are 2 8 = 256 total cellular automata. Let S i denotes the current state of the i th cell at time t, and f is a Boolean state function that specifies the local rule. At time t + 1, the next state value of S i is produced by the rule f :
If all CA cells obey the same rule, the CA is said to be uniform; otherwise, it is non-uniform. The CA in the original design has 8 cells which are generated by the logistic chaotic map. The image key is produced according to the eight rules shown in TABLE 1.
C. THE ENCRYPTION SCHEME
The sketch of the original scheme [22] is shown in Fig. 1 . The color image encryption scheme can be described as follows. Step1: The input is a color image P(M , N , 3) where M and N denote the rows and columns of the image, respectively. Step2: The color image is divided into three components, red, green and blue, denoted by P R , P G and P B respectively. Step3: By using the 3-D cat map, three chaos sequences {xr}, {yg}, {zb} of length M and three chaos sequences {rr}, {sg}, {tb} of length N are generated. Initial 
Then, use the sorted sequences {hr}, {hg}, {hb} and {lr}, {lg}, {lb} to permute all of the pixels of P according to (7) for the rows and (8) for the columns of each color component
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Step4: Logistic map with the initial value X 0 and the parameter value α = 4 are iterated 200 times to initialize the CA, and then a key stream image_key of size M × N is created according to the eight rules in TABLE I. The initial value of X 0 is calculated by
where k 0 , k 1 , k 2 , k 3 can be calculated by using
where P R,G,B (i, j) are the values of the pixels of each color component of image in the position (i, j), M is the width of the image and N is the height. If X 0 > 1, X 0 = mod (X 0 , 1). Step5: After iterating (3) for n times, the iteration is continued for M × N times to get three sequences of {x}, {y}, {z}. By permuting the image_key based on {x}, {y}, {z}, one can get image_key 1,2,3 for encrypting the red, green and blue components of P RC R,G,B image, and C R , C G , C B are obtained by
Step6: C R , C G and C B are combined and then the encrypted image C is obtained.
III. SECURITY VULNERABILITIES OF THE ORIGINAL SCHEME
The cryptosystem [22] uses the structure of permutationdiffusion. It was claimed that the approach is robust against different kinds of attacks. However, three security vulnerabilities of the scheme are found and verified by analysis. The drawbacks are shown as follows.
A. SECURITY VULNERABILITY 1
Generally, the encryption scheme needs to follow the confusion-diffusion principle of Shannon, in which the diffusion refers to the fact that changing one bit of the plaintext can cause a widespread change in the ciphertext image by at least 50%. A relationship between the secret key and the image plaintext was established in Step 4 of the original scheme to achieve diffusion effect. However, it was found by analyzing (10) that when the changes of k 1,2,3 can offset each other, the diffusion effect of the scheme would be eliminated. For example, if any two pixels of a plaintext image P, denoted by P(i 1 , j 1 ) and P(i 2 , j 2 ), are changed to get P by P(i 1 , j 1 ) plus ∂ and P(i 2 , j 2 ) minus ∂. It is apparent that the initial value X 0 of Logistic map has no change when P was transformed into P . Therefore, the image_key created in Step 4 of the original scheme gets no change as well. Finally, image_key 1, 2, 3 selected from the image_key by Chen-system with the fixed parameter and initial values also gets no alternate. Consequently, there are only two different pixel values for the two cipher images C and C obtained by encrypting P and P respectively.
The diffusion in a failure situation can be verified experimentally. Firstly, copy the plaintext 256 × 256 'Lena' into duplicate images L 1 and L 2 . Then any one pixel of L 1 is changed by
and any two pixels of L 2 are changed by
Next, cipher images C, C 1 and C 2 are obtained by encrypting 'Lena', L 1 and L 2 respectively. Finally, the result of C XOR C 1 is Y 1 , and similarly, C XOR C 2 is Y 2 . Experimental process is shown in Fig 2. As we can see, Y 1 has some noise pixels, so there are obviously more than 50% different pixels between C and C 1 . While Y 2 has only two nonzero values, there are only two different pixels between C and C 2 .
In order to avoid accidental events, we have done a lot of experiments to verify that the scheme has this security vulnerability. Here is the main data shown in TABLE 3. A conclusion can be obtained from TABLE 3 that when the change of plain-image affects the value of X 0 , the image_key generated in the diffusion phase get change as well, therefore the cryptosystem has diffusion effect; otherwise when the change of plain-image does not affect the value of X 0 , the image_key gets no change, and the diffusion of the scheme fails.
B. SECURITY VULNERABILITY 2
In the permutation phase of the scheme, the threedimensional Arnold mapping was used to create six pseudorandom sequences which were employed to rearrange the rows and columns of each color component. In the diffusion phase, the one-dimensional Logistic map and a one-dimensional non-uniform CA were used to create an image_key, then hyper-chaotic Chen system was used to obtain image_key 1,2,3 from image_key by permutation for encrypting each component of color image.
However, the initial value and parameter of the hyperchaotic map is fixed, that is, the generated chaotic keystreams will keep unchanged with the different plain images.
Consequently, there is a one-to-one map of pixel locations between plain image and cipher image, and there is a bijective relationship between image_key 1,2,3 and image_key. Suppose a known gray image P are denoted by
We change the two values in the first row of P to obtain P m as
and ensure X 0 unchanged, then encrypt P and P m to obtain C and C m respectively and execute C XOR C m to obtain Y m . Obviously, there are two non-zero values in Y m based on Security vulnerability 1. We can get the rank value of two non-zero values. Thus, the corresponding row's location in cipher image of P (1;:) can be obtained. For other rows or columns, the situation is the same. This leads to the vulnerability of CPA.
C. SECURITY VULNERABILITY 3
The Logistic map coupled with a one-dimensional nonuniform CA was used to create an image_key for encrypting a plain image as shown in the step 4 of the diffusion phase. The initial value X 0 of Logistic map depends on each component of the color image according to (9) and (10). That is, the value X 0 isn't fixed, and the image_key will change with X 0 . However, the number of possible values of X 0 with the different plain images is finite according to (9) and (10 
and encrypt O R r to get cipher image C R r . Then, C R r is divided into red, green and blue components, i.e., C Rr , C Gr and C Br , in which C Rr is equivalent to image_key 1 except the only non-zero r, and C Gr and C Br are exactly equivalent to image_key 2 and image_key 3 respectively, because of the property of XOR operation (0 ⊕ A = A) and the fact that permutation does not affect the image component with all-0s. The flowchart of this process is shown in Fig. 3 .
IV. CRYPTANALYSIS
The attacker knows everything about the scheme except the secret keys based on Kerckhoff's principle. The security vulnerabilities proposed above show that the approach can be broken by CPA, which means that the attacker gains access to the encryption scheme and performs cryptanalysis by selecting adequate plaintexts [34] .
We propose a flexible attack scheme which includes breaking the diffusion stage and breaking the permutation stage based on the three security drawbacks. The two main parts of the proposed attack are exchangeable, that is, one can break the diffusion firstly and then the permutation or break the permutation firstly and then the diffusion based on different situations. The attack scheme and simulation experiments are described in detail as follows.
A. BREAKING DIFFUSION STAGE
If a given cipher image C needs to be recovered without the secret keys, the attacker needs to know the equivalent permutation key streams and image_key 1, 2, 3 to recover the plain image P. Thus, our purpose is to reveal all the equivalent key streams. If we get image_key 1,2,3 , we can see that
according to (11) and the reversible property of XOR (A ⊕ B ⊕ B = A). Thus, the diffusion of encryption algorithm can be cracked. However, the number of possibilities of image_key 1,2,3 is all 256 based on the security vulnerability 3. The attacker does not know which image_key 1,2,3 is used in the scheme. Therefore, the attacker needs to obtain all 256 possible cracked images first, and then perform a further correlation analysis on the images to select the correct cracked image. The correct cracked image can be easily identified because it must be the only meaningful image in the 256 possibilities due to the strong randomicity, ergodicity and sensitivity of the used chaotic maps in the encryption scheme. From what have been discussed, the core idea of breaking diffusion phase is to find out all 256 image_key 1,2,3 . Different image_key 1,2,3 results from the changing X 0 based on the Security vulnerability 3. According to (10) , the reason for the change of X 0 is the sum of plain pixels. Therefore, 256 special plain images denoted by {O R r } 255 r=0 (shown as Eq. (16)) with all 0s except the first pixels r in the red component ranging from 0 to 255 are chosen to break the diffusion stage. Suppose the corresponding cipher images are {C In this phrase, all values in KTs can be obtained using the special 256 × 2 plain-cipher image pairs. Thus, the computational complexity of this phase is O(256 × 2 × 3 × M × N).
B. BREAKING PERMUTATION STAGE
Three sequences of length M and three sequences of length N are separately generated based on 3-D cat map in the permutation stage of the encryption scheme, then one can perform rows and columns scramble for the red, green and blue components of the color image respectively. As described in security vulnerabilities 1, when the sum of image pixel values remains unchanged, the diffusion effect will be eliminated. Moreover, the initial values and parameters for 3-D cat map are fixed based on security vulnerabilities 2. Therefore, the permutation key streams (hr, hg, hb and lr, lg, lb) can be obtained by launching CPA according to the two drawbacks.
Supposing the components P R , P G , P B of a known image P, we change the two values in each row in order to obtain P r R , P , 1) = mod(P G (r, 1) − 1, 256) , P r G (r, 2) = mod(P G (r, 2) + 1, 256). P r B (r, 1) = mod(P B (r, 1) − 1, 256), P r B (r, 2) = mod(P B (r, 2) + 1, 256). (17) then merge the changed components to get P r (r = 1, 2, . . . , M).
There is no difference between the values of X 0 for images P and P r . Two pixels at least determine the position of a row or a column for one matrix, this is the reason why we change the first two values of each line in each channel image. After that, we encrypt P and P r to get C and C r , here the result The rank values of two non-zero elements in each channel is the first rule of row permutation map, which are denoted by hr (1), hg (1), hb (1) . In this way, all the row disorganized sequences hr, hg, hb can be obtained. Similarly, the column scramble sequences lr, lg, lb also can be obtained.
The detailed approach of breaking permutation stage can be described as follows.
• Cracking the row scrambling sequences hr, hg, hb: Step1: Encrypt a known image P and the changed P r to obtain the cipher images C and C r respectively. and (x R1 , y R2 ), (x G1 , y G1 ) and (x G1 , y G2 ), (x B1 , y B1 ) and (x B1 , y B2 ), where x denotes the row number and y denotes the column number. The values of x R1 , x G1 , and x B1 are used to set the values of row permutation sequences hr(r), hg(r) and hb(r) respectively. Step4: Alter r and repeat Step1-3 until all the elements of row permutation sequences are revealed.
• Cracking the column scrambling sequences lr, lg, lb:
Step1: Encrypt a known image P and the changed P c to obtain cipher image C and C c respectively. P c is calculated by (2, c) + 1, 256) . 
where x denotes the row number and y denotes the column number. The values of y R1 , y G1 and y B1 are used to set the values of column permutation sequences lr(c), lg(c) and lb(c) respectively. Step4: Alter c and repeat Step1-3 until all the elements of column permutation sequences are revealed. The permutation of original scheme is based on row and column scrambling. Therefore, the computational complexity of this phrase for a color image sized M × N × 3 is O (3 × (M + N) ).
C. THE COMMUTATIVE ATTACK SCHEMES
From the above we can see, the core idea of the breaking diffusion phase is to build all the values of image_key 1, 2, 3 into KTs While the key point for breaking permutation stage is to find out six scrambling sequences hr, hg, hb, lr, lg, and lb. Since the two phases of the attack are independent with each other, the order of them can be exchanged. That is, the proposed attack procedure is of high flexibility. The two attack schemes in different order are as follows.
• Scheme I: breaking diffusion and then permutation. Step1: Decompose a given color cipher image C into three components C R , C G , C B , and scan the three twodimensional images from top to bottom, left to right respectively. Step2: Obtain the KTs including image_key 1 and {P Br } 255 r=0 respectively. Step6: Find out the most relevant image P Rr which is the correct red decryption map from {P Rr } 255 r=0 by utilizing vector correlation analysis, and then return r value. In correlation analysis, the correlation coefficient of two vectors V 1 , V 2 of a matrix calculated by
where V 1 , V 2 denotes the dot product between V 1 and V 2 . V 1 and V 2 indicate the length of a vector. The correct decipher image P Rr are selected from {P Rr } 255 r=0 by operations (i)-(ii) as follows: (i) Select two columns V 1 and V 2 randomly from the image P Rr and calculate their correlation coefficient ρ r . Save ρ r to ρ r = [ρ r ] 255 r=0 . (ii) Find the maximum value ρ r and return k. Then the deciphered image is P Rr .
The green and blue components are processed in the same way to obtain P Gr and P Br respectively. Step7: Merge the three channel images P Rr , P Gr and P Br for obtaining the decrypted color image P. The simulation on real natural image is performed to test the effectiveness of the proposed method. In Fig. 4 , the encrypted image Fig. 4 (b) is obtained by encrypting Fig. 4(a) . Fig.4(c), (d) and (e) are the three components from Fig. 4 (b) by de-diffusion stage firstly of Scheme I. When the three images are further decrypted, the decrypted three channel images are shown as Fig. 4(f) , (g) and (h). The recovery result is shown in Fig. 4(i) . Therefore, the original encryption scheme has been broken by the proposed Scheme I.
• Scheme II: breaking permutation and then diffusion: Step1: Decompose a given color cipher image C into three components C R , C G , C B . Step2: Get the permutation key streams hr, hg, hb and lr, lg, lb by using the CPA proposed in Sec. III. B. Step3: Obtain KTs including image_key 1,2,3 by breaking diffusion stage shown in Sec. IV. A. Step4: C R , C G , C B are de-scrambled based on the permutation rules to obtain C R , C G , C B respectively. 256 image_key 1, 2, 3 in KTs are changed sequentially as C R , C G and C B de-scrambled operation to get the changed KT s. Step5: 256 image_key 1 respectively. Step6: Find out the most relevant image P Rr , P Gr and P Br which are the correct red, green and blue decryption VOLUME 6, 2018 map from {P Rr } 255 r=0 , {P Gr } 255 r=0 and {P Br } 255 r=0 respectively by utilizing vector correlation analysis. The process is the same as that of Step 6 in Scheme I. Step7: Merge the three channel images P Rr , P Gr and P Br for getting the decrypted color image P. To verify the above attack Scheme II, some experiments were further performed. A plain image 'fruits' sized 256 × 256 as shown in Fig. 5 (a) is encrypted by the original encryption scheme, and the corresponding cipher image is shown in Fig. 5 (b) . The de-permutation results of the three components of Fig. 5 (b) are shown in Fig. 5 (c), (d) and (e) respectively, and the further de-diffused three components are shown in Fig. 5 (f) , (g) and (h) respectively. The decrypted color image is depicted in Fig.5 (i) , which is the same as Fig. 5(a) , showing that the original encryption scheme is entirely broken by Scheme II.
D. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEMES
As shown in Fig. 4 and 5, both of the two schemes proposed above could recover the encrypted images with 100% recovery rate. However, the computational complexities of these two schemes are different, because Scheme II needs to additionally change the rows and columns position of all image_key 1,2,3 of KTs to get the updated KT s. Thus, the computational complexity of scheme II is O (3 × (M + N)) more than that of Scheme I. It is noted that the KTs for breaking diffusion can be stored in advance in order to reduce the computational complexity of both schemes in the attack process. In [37] , there are three breaking schemes by ciphertext-only Attack (COA), known-plaintext attack (KPA) and CPA on an image scrambling encryption algorithm (ISEA) respectively. The permutation of the original scheme can be seen as IESA after de-diffusion firstly (in scheme I), and it is easily attacked. Therefore, Scheme I is better than Scheme II in terms of computational complexity and flexibility.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyzed an encryption algorithm based on hybrid hyper-chaos and cellular automata. Three security flaws about the original cryptosystem are found. The leading weakness among them is that the diffusion effect can be offset by maintaining the sum of pixel values unchanged. Moreover, two commutative attack schemes are proposed. All the equivalent key streams used for encryption can be revealed. Based on the cryptanalysis of this paper, we also proposed three guidelines for improving the security of the image encryption scheme:
1) The relevance between secret key and plaintext should be complex instead of determining the key simply based on the sum of pixel values.
2) It is suggested to add an effective diffusion function after performing XOR.
3) Multiple rounds of permutation-diffusion should be adopted. He has published over 70 refereed journal articles and conference papers in his research areas. His research interests include multimedia security, compressive sensing security, cloud computing, and big data security. VOLUME 6, 2018 
